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The currency crisis, caused by the collapse in gas prices, has turned into the most serious so-
cial and political crisis in the history of Turkmenistan. The government in Ashgabat has passed 
the burden of the economic problems onto the population, suspending the convertibility of 
the manat and dismantling the extensive social security system. The drastic reduction in the 
standard of living of Turkmenistan’s population has undermined the stability of the regime. 
The depletion of Turkmenistan’s foreign exchange reserves could bring an end to the monu-
mental state investment programme which – together with the social security system – is the 
main source of the regime’s legitimacy. The current dynamics of the crisis are fully depend-
ent on China, the sole recipient of Turkmenistan’s gas (receiving more than 90% of total gas 
exports) and Ashgabat’s main creditor. The terms of the Chinese-Turkmen contracts (appar-
ently linking gas prices with oil prices) is leading to a drain of Turkmen resources and reducing 
the inflow of foreign currency. China may be faced with the need to stabilise the economy 
of Turkmenistan. In the absence of any rescue actions, there is a considerable risk of the col-
lapse of the Turkmen state. However, any greater involvement by China could mean a viola-
tion of the Chinese-Russian modus vivendi in the region. Moscow could take advantage of the 
crisis to rebuild its influence in Ashgabat, and include Turkmenistan within its own political 
integration projects within the region, resuming gas cooperation and offering military assis-
tance to stabilise the regime.
The currency crisis in Turkmenistan is a direct 
result of the rapid fall of prices on the global 
markets for oil and gas since 2014. The average 
price of the gas exported to China, which re-
ceives more than 90% of Turkmenistan’s gas ex-
ports, has fallen from around US$503 per tonne 
in 2014 to $266 in 2017. This has led to a dras-
tic reduction in the amount of foreign currency 
coming into Turkmenistan, causing an imbal-
ance in the current account and putting strong 
downward pressure on the Turkmen currency, 
the manat. Turkmenistan’s current account defi-
cit rose from around 5% of GDP in 2014 to 21% 
of GDP in 2016. In their attempts to maintain 
a fixed exchange rate against the US dollar, in 
January 2015 Turkmenistan’s authorities intro-
duced a small devaluation of the manat (from 
2.9 to 3.5 per dollar), and in January 2016 they 
completely suspended the convertibility of the 
manat into dollars for citizens (as well as pri-
vate companies). The option of buying dollars 
at the official rate is now only available to en-
tities involved in priority projects, such as the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) 
pipeline, and the Asian Games in 20171. 
1 O. Auyezov, Exclusive: Turkmenistan limits access to 
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The lack of access to foreign currency among 
the population and the private sector has inflat-
ed the the black market rate for the US dollar, 
which rose from 6 to around 30 manats from 
2016 to 2018.
Multidimensional dependence on China
One factor aggravating the crisis was the se-
ries of mistakes in Turkmenistan’s energy pol-
icy, leading to a harmful dependence on the 
Chinese market. As a result of the conflict over 
gas prices with Iran (2016), followed by the lim-
itation and then suspension of imports by the 
Russian Gazprom after 2009, China is now the 
only major customer for Turkmen gas. In 2017 it 
received around 94% of the volume of Turkmen 
gas exports, which represented around 90% of 
the total value of Turkmenistan’s total exports 
(and the most important source of the coun-
try’s foreign currency revenues). Although the 
details of the supply contracts to China are not 
known, the sharp decline in the average price 
since 2014 indicates a formula linking the price 
of gas with that of oil. According to Chinese 
data, imports from Turkmenistan rose in 2014-
17, from 18 million tons to 24 million tons of 
gas (see Annex), while Turkmenistan’s total rev-
enue fell from US$9.4 billion to US$6.5 billion. 
The Chinese market does not compensate for 
the lost revenue from the Russian and Iranian 
markets, and the total export volume of gas 
from Turkmenistan declined in 2014-17 from 
41.6 to 33.6 bcm2.
Turkmenistan is also bound by credit agree-
ments with Chinese banks, which since 2009 
have provided financing for the development 
of gas deposits for the previously self-sufficient 
Turkmenistan. In 2009-11, the total value of 
these loans stood at US$8.1 billion; in 2013 fur-
ther contracts of unknown value were signed. 
China is now Turkmenistan’s largest creditor 
(the state’s entire foreign debt is approximate-
ly US$9 billion3), and the repayment of the 
2 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2018.
3 Asian Development Bank Outlook (ADO) 2018.
Chinese loans takes up at least US$1 billion an-
nually4. Moreover, a part of the fixed repayment 
tranches denominated in US dollars is likely be-
ing repaid in gas in current prices, in the so-
called credit-for-resources formula that China 
has also used in its dealings with Venezuela 
and Angola5. These contracts were concluded 
in times of high prices for oil and gas, and after 
those prices fell, the states bound by them were 
forced to supply more of their raw materials. 
In Turkmenistan’s case, this model has meant 
a further drain on local resources, with a clearly 
reduced inflow of foreign exchange6.
The inertia of Turkmenistan’s economic 
model
So far, the strategy of Turkmenistan’s govern-
ment has been to pass the burden of the cur-
rency crisis onto the general public. Depriving 
its citizens and private business of the possibili-
ty to exchange the currency at the official rate, 
together with a steep rise in the black market 
rate, has significantly increased the cost of im-
ported goods7. At the same time, the govern-
ment in Ashgabat is continuing its policy of 
4 Authors’ calculations, based on information about the 
conditions of loans obtained from news agency reports.
5 Y. Chazan, Angola’s debt reliance on China may leave 
it short-changed, “Financial Times”, 13 June 2018, 
https://www.ft.com/content/fb9f8528-6f03-11e8-92d3-
6c13e5c92914
6 O. Auyezov, Exclusive: Turkmenistan limits access to 
foreign currency as exports fall, Reuters, 20 June 2016, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-turkmenistan-econo-
my-exclusive-idUKKCN100153
7 However, the share of consumption in Turkmenistan’s 
GDP is so low (11% of GDP) that a drop in the popula-
tion’s real disposable income need not necessarily lead 
to an economic recession. The primary driving force re-
mains net exports and investments (29.9% and 49.1% 
respectively of GDP in 2015, UNCTAD).
The current form of the cooperation with 
China is leading to a drain of local resources 
accompanied by a clearly reduced inflow of 
foreign currency which the country needs.
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spectacular public investments, which generate 
up to around 41% of the country’s GDP. Along 
with the stimulation of the economy, these ac-
tions also legitimise the government and sym-
bolically bind together the Turkmen nation, 
composed of conflicting tribes, and so they are 
seen as an essential element in maintaining the 
stability of the regime8. However, as Turkmeni-
stan’s economy is effectively a gas-based mon-
oculture, every project of this type generates 
demand for significant imports of goods and 
services, thus expanding the current account 
deficit and exacerbating the currency crisis9. 
Whether this policy can be continued will de-
pend on the capacity of Turkmenistan’s author-
ities to further defend the manat’s official ex-
change rate to keep afloat the sectors of the 
economy dependent on it and to service the 
country’s foreign debt (estimated at 30.2% of 
GDP in 2018). The amount of Turkmenistan’s 
foreign exchange reserves is not officially 
published, but they are gradually depleting10. 
Although the official GDP growth amounted to 
6.5% in 2017, reports from Turkmenistan since 
the end of 2017 indicate serious budgetary 
problems and the onset of an economic crisis. 
8 For more on the formation of the tribal Turkmen nation 
and the role of monumental construction, see A L Edgar, 
Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan, Prince-
ton 2004; J. Šír, Cult of Personality in Monumental Art 
and Architecture: The Case of Post-Soviet Turkmenistan, 
“Acta Slavica Iaponica” 2008, vol. 25, pp. 203-220.
9 According to data from the Asia Development Bank, the gap 
in the current account turnover has so far been balanced out 
by the inflow of foreign direct investments, to the level of 
12% of Turkmenistan’s GDP of in 2016. The government has 
also sought to stimulate industries by substituting imports.
10 After a visit to Ashgabat in November 2015, the IMF an-
nounced that the available reserves could cover imports for 
about 30 months; in 2017 the figure was only 20 months.
The social crisis and the crisis 
of the state 
One of the fundamental dimensions of the so-
cial crisis is linked with the repressive control of 
currency outflows by the Turkmen authorities. 
The ban on exchanging foreign currencies, the 
state capture of domestic savings denominated 
in US dollars, and the blockade on foreign cur-
rency transfers outside the country have led to 
problems for those social groups who interact 
with foreign countries: guest workers, business-
men, students and others. Limits and blockades 
have been introduced on ATM cards for with-
drawals from Turkmen banks abroad. As trad-
ing in foreign currencies has been prohibited, 
the informal internal economic exchange based 
on dollars has been liquidated. Black market 
currency traders (often linked with the special 
services) are being repressed, along with small 
and medium-sized businesses. 
The rapidly rising inflation rate, estimated by 
foreign economists at about 294%11, is bring-
ing about a deficit of basic (largely imported) 
consumer goods, including foodstuffs. This 
particularly affects the poorest social strata. 
The crisis has aggravated the negative trends 
in Turkmenistan’s agriculture and animal breed-
ing caused by structural problems, such as in-
adequate investment and the lack of qualified 
workers. The authorities have resorted to food 
rationing; its most extreme forms are to be 
found in the outermost regions. Until January 
2016 the official exchange rate for the US dollar 
was 3.5 manat, while on the black market the 
figure was 7 manats. It then began to rise by 
leaps and bounds, reaching a record high of 30 
manats in early June 2018, and at present fluc-
tuating around 17 to 20 manats.
11 This applies to the prices of imported goods sold out-
side the official Turkmen price-control regime (including 
foodstuffs). The estimates are based on the rise in the 
black-market rates of the manat to the US dollar from May 
2017 to May 2018. The official inflation rate in Turkmen-
istan was 8% in 2017. Turkmenistan’s vicious cycle. State 
media distracts with giant bicycle get-togethers as the 
economy spins its wheels and the secret police represses, 
https://eurasianet.org/s/turkmenistans-vicious-cycle
The social crisis is caused by rising in-
flation, mass firings of state employees, 
as well as food rationing. This is causing 
mass emigration in search of better living 
conditions.
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The reaction to the crisis has increased the pace 
of emigration for work abroad, mainly to Tur-
key (and also Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, Cy-
prus, etc.). The largest numbers of emigrants 
come from the north and east of the country. 
The government has been blocking this to some 
extent by introducing an informal ban on trips 
abroad to citizens below 40 years of age, in an 
attempt to restrict the outflow of labour.
The economic crisis is leading to budgetary 
problems in Turkmenistan. 2017 saw the dis-
mantling of the social security system, includ-
ing the citizens’ right to the free monthly con-
sumption of specific amounts of water, gas, 
electricity and gasoline. The mass layoffs of 
government officials has proved particularly 
difficult for the public12, along with delays of 
several months in paying salaries and the exten-
sion of unpaid extra work hours. Turkmenistan 
has also stopped repaying its debts to some 
foreign companies, mainly Turkish and Belaru-
sian, which have been investing in the country’s 
construction and energy markets.
Fearing a palace coup, President Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedov has reduced his travels abroad 
over the course of the last year to a minimum. 
At the same time he has been promoting his 
son Serdar Berdimuhamedov as his successor. 
Since the end of last year he has officially rep-
resented Turkmenistan at almost every diplo-
matic event abroad, serving formally as a dep-
uty minister of foreign affairs, and de facto as 
the deputy head of the state.
12 In Turkmenistan, as in other countries in Central Asia, 
civil servants make up a substantial percentage of peo-
ple who have a steady job.
To counter the creeping descent into anarchy, 
the authorities have introduced a series of re-
forms which are tools for the de facto discipline 
and preventive repression of society. These in-
clude stronger restrictions on the dress code 
for women working in the public sector; a strict 
prohibition of bigamous marriage has been in-
troduced (which has hit the political, business 
and religious elite – the majority of their rep-
resentatives conduct additional informal rela-
tionships, in some cases sanctioned by religious 
beliefs), and alcohol prohibition has been intro-
duced in selected regions. The persecution of 
people and groups who are distinguished by 
religiosity in Turkmenistan’s secular society has 
been increased.
Conclusions
By shifting the burden of the crisis onto the 
general public, the Turkmen authorities have 
effectively violated the informal social con-
tract, binding the government with society 
since 1995. According to it, while the polit-
ical system of Turkmenistan was the most 
extreme variant of Central Asian authoritari-
anism, the people did receive important sub-
sidies (water supplies, cheap food, energy re-
sources) and social relief from the state. Social 
security was also a key element legitimising 
the government in Turkmenistan, along with 
the monumental construction programme 
and the state’s neutral status (a guarantee that 
the society would not be involved in armed 
conflict). The removal of these social advan-
tages has translated into a social crisis, weak-
ening the regime’s stability and its position in 
its relationship with Turkmen society.
As a result of the country’s deep and mul-
ti-layered economic dependency on China, the 
course of the crisis in Turkmenistan has become 
heavily dependent on the actions of Beijing. 
Some of the underlying causes of the Turkmen 
crisis are largely independent of Beijing’s policy, 
In response to the crisis, the government 
has introduced a range of reforms for the 
de facto discipline and preventive repres-
sion of the society.
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including the collapse of oil prices in 2014 and 
Ashgabat’s conflicts with its other customers. 
However, the nature of the present economic 
dependency, as well as the current dynamics 
of the crisis, is a direct result of Beijing’s long-
term policy. The expansion of the gas-related 
infrastructure, based on Chinese loans, has bur-
dened the Turkmen budget. Additionally, the 
loans are being partially repaid in kind (gas), 
and the price of gas supplies is linked with 
current global gas markets, which exacerbates 
Turkmenistan’s balance of payments problems. 
Beijing took advantage of its strong negoti-
ating position, which in part resulted from 
Ashgabat’s conflicts with its other partners, to 
transfer the long-term economic risk onto Turk-
menistan. This has translated into the country’s 
current socio-economic crisis.
Prospects
In the current situation, the most favourable 
scenario for the government of Turkmenistan is 
linked with the potential increase in global com-
modity prices. A small boost to the average price 
of gas supplied to China in 2017 has led to a re-
duction in the current account deficit to 11.5%. 
Another potential way to extend the life of the 
regime would be to acquire foreign loans to sup-
port the manat’s official rate, which would tem-
porarily help to stabilise the budget’s situation 
and support the government’s investments. How-
ever, if the economic crisis deepens further, that 
could lead to the implosion of state structures. 
In the most extreme scenario, this could lead to 
the collapse of the state of Turkmenistan and 
a resulting political vacuum which could be filled 
by radical groups of militants from neighbour-
ing Afghanistan. In the latter’s north-western 
districts, the structures of the Taliban and Islam-
ic State movements have been strengthening 
among the Uzbek and Turkmen minorities for 
several years. Despite the vastly oppressive na-
ture of the Turkmen regime, its structures would 
prove weak in a confrontation with an external 
enemy, and would display very low resistance to 
open political violence.
The deepening crisis may force China to take 
a decision to stabilise the economy of Turkmen-
istan. Currently it is China’s biggest supplier of 
gas, responsible for 36% of imports, and 13% 
of Chinese gas consumption. Despite its large 
gas reserves and access to alternative sources 
(such as LNG), a sudden halt of supplies from 
Turkmenistan could negatively affect the Chi-
nese economy. One possible scenario would 
be for Chinese banks to offer loans to stabilise 
the manat13. Beijing could also reduce the bur-
den arising from the repayments by acquiring 
the Turkmen assets (the gas deposit infrastruc-
ture) which those repayments funded14. The 
most extreme scenario would be to present 
Turkmenistan with a reform plan linked to a sta-
bility package and the introduction of special 
economic zones managed by China. However, 
this scenario would represent a deep intrusion 
into Turkmenistan’s internal affairs, and Beijing 
has shunned such open interventions aimed at 
stabilising those economies in Asia and around 
the world which are dependent on it. 
The crisis in Turkmenistan is violating the mo-
dus vivendi of the Chinese-Russian cooperation 
functioning in Turkmenistan and Central Asia. 
This had been based on Moscow’s acceptance of 
growing Chinese economic influence in return 
for concessions in the political and security fields. 
13 China is apparently providing such emergency loans to Pa-
kistan, which is also struggling with its own currency crisis 
arising, in part, from the need to repay Chinese loans.
14 This model has been carried out in the case of the deep- 
-water port in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, among others.
The deepening economic problems may 
lead to the implosion of state structures, 
and in the worst case to the collapse of 
Turkmenistan.
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The economic destabilisation of states in the re-
gion as a result of their financial dependency on 
China15 may create an opportunity for Moscow 
to get more intensively involved and strength-
en its influence at China’s expense. With re-
gard to Turkmenistan, the Kremlin has adopted 
a ‘wait and see’ approach16, so that if the cri-
sis develops further, it will be able to dictate 
15 While Turkmenistan is the most extreme case, similar 
symptoms of a balance of payments crisis in the region 
are also being displayed by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; 
see J. Hurley, S. Morris, G. Portelance, Examining the 
Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from 
a Policy Perspective, “CGD Policy Paper” 121, March 2018.
16 Moscow has been supporting Ashgabat to a limited 
extent from the end of 2016, resulting in a thaw in the 
bilateral relationship (President Putin paid an official vis-
it to Ashgabat in 2017, among other moves).
its terms to Ashgabat concerning the access to 
Russia-led political and economic forms for in-
tegrating the post-Soviet space. In an extreme 
situation, it could offer military assistance in 
order to stabilise the situation. Moscow may 
also potentially resume its gas cooperation with 
Turkmenistan, or lift its blockade of the transit 
of the latter’s gas to Europe. The present terms 
and conditions for the provision of assistance 
from Moscow, to which the Turkmen govern-
ment has not yet expressed its consent, assume 
official cooperation in the security sphere, the 
presence of groups of Russian observers and 
military advisers, as well as close cooperation 
between the departments of force and intelli-
gence services of both states.
Chinese imports of natural gas from Turkmenistan 2009–2017
ANNEX
Source: Chinese Customs
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